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The subject assigned for discussion in this conference assumes the
desirability of a casebook on legal history, and calls specifically for dis-
cussion of its province and its arrangement only. It seems evident,
however, that underlying all other questions is this: what is to be the
purpose of the course for which the suggested casebook is to be com-
piled? Purpose must necessarily determine in a general way the
province, alike as to time and subject matter; and purpose and province
must together control the choice of detailed content and the arrangement
thereof. It is therefpre manifestly impossible to discuss these topics
individually; accordingly I shall consider together, and in a general
way, all of them-purpose, desirability, province in time and content,
and arrangement.'
Legal history may be introduced into ihe curriculum-and in fact has
been introduced by various schools, members of this Association-in
different years, in varying manner, and for diverse purposes. Aside
from set courses in legal history, it is not to be forgotten that scores of
the fundamental concepts of the law are historically developed through
cases in the various technical courses of the curriculum; nor should it
be overlooked that in' various schools a considerable amount of genuine
training in research is given by instructors in supervision of student
notes prepared for law reviews. Of set courses, either exclusively
devoted to legal history or (as indicated by the catalogue descriptions)
avowedly based to a greater or less extent upon historical exposition, it
* A paper read in the conference on Jurisprudence and Legal History during the
recent meeting (Dec. 29-31) of the Association of American Law Schools. A
few slight omissions and additions have been made in the interest of clarity.
'The Chairman of the Conference, Professor George E. Woodbine, requested
consideration, by those who were to read papers in the Conference, of the following
questions, to most of which answers are given, either explicitly or by implication,
in the present paper. First, with respect to the proper province of a casebook:-
at what date it should begin, and how far come down; whether it should cover all
the older law or nierely the origin and development of what have become funda-
mental ideas and relations in our law; be confined to common law, or also deal
with equity, and with the old ecclesiastical jurisdiction'; and whether by its aid
we may be enabled to dispense with historical introductions to our technical
courses. Second, with respect to method of compilation :-whether it should be
arranged chronologically or topically; whether one might start at a middle point
and work both backward and forward; whether the book should deal with topics
individually and as wholes, or with various topics at the same time; give,
preferably, a cross-section of time or of law; contain cases only, or both cases and
extracts from the early writers,-and if from both, whether there is any general
principle that should govern the amount of each to be incorporated.
[7203
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appears that the following are either now offered, or have within recent
years been offered, in schools of this Association: so-called introductory
courses ("introductory law," "elementary jurisprudence," etc.), in 3
schools; courses on the general history (or "history and system" or
"fundamental institutions") of the common law, in 13 schools; on the
primitive Germanic or medieval English basis of our law, in 3 schools;
on special fields or topics of the law (history of property, of contract,
of modern procedure, of attaint, etc.), in 5 schools; on the origins and
development of the local state law, in 3 schools; required reading-
courses, for students of one or more years, in 3 schools; and courses
in research, in 2 schools-not counting one course on "research" that
is apparently conducted by lectures only! Twenty schools of our
Association have participated in these experiments. In divers combina-
tions the following books appear as the basis (when specifically indi-
cated) of the courses just indicated: the histories of Jenks, of Maitland
& Montague, of Holdsworth; Blackstone's "Commentaries"; Holmes's
"Common Law"; Pollock's "First Book of Jurisprudence"; Maitland's
"Forms of Action"; Maine's "Ancient Law"; Pound's "Readings on the
History and System of the Common Law"; Street's "Legal Liability";
this Association's series on "Evolution of Law" and its "Select Essays
on Anglo-American Law"; various of the Yorke Prize Essays; Camp-
bell's "Lives"; Lewis's "Lives"; Warren's "American Bar"; Bald-
win's "American judiciary." In optional reading courses, for which
credit is given, in the field of history, various other books are included.
Courses in legal bibliography are ignored, inasmuch as most of these
courses probably deal solely with the lawyer's practical modern tools,
although these courses in at least two schools are more historical and
scholarly.
I cannot, of course, indicate the purposes for which these several
courses are, in fact, offered. I can only state what, in my opinion,
should be those purposes; and then, with reference to ends thus dogma-
tically postulated, express my further opinions respecting the desirability
of a casebook as a means for realizing those ends. This I shall proceed
to do.
We may evidently in this connection leave out of account all courses
in research. The opportunities are immense, and our hopes are high,
with respect to that portion of the curriculum; but for the student really
qualified to do research work the only possible casebook is the whole
body of the printed law. Personally, I would also lay aside at once all
thoughts of casebooks so comprehensive in scope that they would
encroach, to any considerable extent; upon the case material which, in
the several technical courses, presents in the slowly unfolding detail of
decisions the shaping of particular doctrines.
2  In their study the
'Such topics might, however, evidently be used with excellent results. Professor
Nathan Isaacs, who opened the discussion of this paper, advocated the use of
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student will daily find the light of history on his path, and in their study
he should also learn the elementals of research. But if we should
attempt, for the purposes of a special course in legal history, to take
over the history of all subjects, or even of their leading conceptd, our
undertaking would be wrecked upon ambition.
My attention is accordingly confined to introductory courses and to a
generalized historical course for more advanced students.
First, then, as regards an introductory course. Many schools mani-
festly regard such a course as desirable. Should we compile for such
a coui-se a casebook? In my opinion the tyro should not, in such a
,course, be plunged into cases. For one reason, because he gets enough
of these in his other courses; for another, because the great majority of
leading cases are, as regards their historical significance, quite beyond a
tyro's comprehension-at all events to any degree that would be fruitful;
and for another reason, because cases will not yield, except when studied
in enormous bulk, the material which seems (to me) most desirable-
this last reason being dependent upon the purposes that I postulate for
the course in question, which purposes will be stated in a moment.
When I say that it seems impracticable (either in an introductory course
or, for different reasons, in any general course) to teach legal history
primarily by' "cases," I mean of course by decisions. It is easy to find
opinions containing disquisitions on history-; but unless an historical
assertion is essential to the decision one learns no history from the
case-strictly. The disquisitions are only textbook matter in judicial
opinions, and may or may not be well considered. Such, for example,
are Chief Justice Cockburn's history of prescription, in Angus v.
Dalton;s Lord Justice Fry's history of delivery in the law of gifts, in
Cochrane v. Moore;4 Lord Hardwicke's history of gifts causa 'mortis,
in Ward v. Turner;5 and the history of the bailee's right to recover full
value and of his liability to account to the bailor, given by Collins, M.R.,
in the case of The Winkfield.6 To take another example, there is no
difference between historical statements made by Lord Blackburn in his
selected topics of this kind, in addition to others not directly covered in any of the
technical courses. He suggested a casebook consisting of three main parts, as
follows. First, a "general part," designed to show the larger features of the
external history of our law, give information regarding our great legal writers
and classics, and emphasize the lawyer's actual use of history. Second, a "parti-
cular part," in which should be developed the history of various selected principles
or subjects; such as the doctrine of consideration, the property rights of married
women, and the relation between law and morality. Third, a list of problems that
could be assigned to students for research. Professor Isaacs would utilize case
material so far as possible; and though the present writer would do the same, it
is probable that Professor Isaacs would be more reluctant to recognize other
materials as equally good or better in a given case.
(1877) L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 85, 103.
(i89o, C. A.) L. R. 25 Q. B. Div. 57, 64.
'(1752, Ch.) 2 Ves. Sen. 431, 439.
'[19o2, C. A.] P. 42, 58.
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textbook on sales and similar statements made by way of dictum in his
opinions. However great might be the interest and value of a collection
of opinions reprinted for the sake of historical dicta, such a collection is
not one from which a student will learn legal history from cases. He
may, however, learn therefrom that judges find it necessary, or desirable,
to study history; and he may or may not acquire therefrom sound
historical information. But suppose that a case really does embody a
point of history: take e. g. Thurston v. Blanchard
7 which shows the
extension of trover to cover the situation where the defendant admit-
tedly secured title, but by fraud. In one of our excellent casebooks on
personal property that case appears, as regards that point, alone. Can
any student learn from that one case its historical significance?
Evidently he cannot. He must learn that either through textbook
commentary (printed, or the oral comment of the instructor) or through
the study of many decisions in the field of trover. There cannot be
many cases in which history-history in a broader form than the history
of minute points of doctrine-is to be learned from decisions; and of
such cases, printed alone, no student could learn the significance inde-
pendently of extraneous comment. On the other hand, of course,
history-and history in a fairly broad sense-can be learned from long
series of decisions; but we cannot have a casebook of a hundred volumes
by which to teach legal history in this manner.
Whether or not a reading book should be compiled of materials
primarily other than cases in the strict sense-giving, of course, all
justifiable prominence, under this head, to judicial digressions into the
field of history-seems to be substantially a question of convenience.
An examination of the material actually used in such courses shows that
cases are in general not utilized, and that the range of other materials
utilized is exceedingly great. In some schools members of the faculty
lecture, combining history with analysis and exposition, upon the law's
sources, its chief divisions, the judicial system, decisions and reports,
the doctrine of precedents, etc. In another school an instructor seeks
to open the minds of beginners by requiring them to read Justice
Holmes's essays on The Path of the Law8 and Law in Science and
Science in Law. And so on. I can only say that I would not accept
as complete and ideal, for my own use, any selection adopted in any
school thus far. I should add matter from various books not included
in the list noted above; and I suspect that various of my auditors would
do the same. In short, reading matter, admirable for novices, is abun-
dant, and instructors may freely choose and assign. In view of the
diversity of choice by them expressed, it would seem of questionable
expediency to compile a set selection of readings.
(1839, Mass.) 22 Pick. 18.
(1897) IO HARV. L. R1v. 457; Collected Legal Papers (192o) 167.
(1899) 12 HARv. L. REv..443; Collected Legal Papers (1920) 210.
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It is quite possible, however, that a selection could be made so catholic
as to suit everybody. I will only state what I would postulate as the
purpose of such a course, and thereby indicate what must be in any
reading book compiled, if it were to suit me. This egoism is imposed
by circumstances; as already explained, and may therefore, I trust, be
pardoned.
In my opinion the objectives of an introductory course should
primarily be these: to stimulate the beginner's curiosity respecting the
law's past; to teach him the nature of judicial law, indicate the growing
bulk of reports and of statutes and the relative scope of our enacted and
unenacted law, and suggest to him the respective merits and demerits
of judicial decisions and of legislation as agencies of legal growth; to
teach him, of course, that there is history in the law-though that fact
he will be learning day by day in his technical courses,-but also, above
and beyond that, to suggest to him the broader social implications of
the law's -history; to start him with the idea that in entering upon the
study of the private law he begins the study of a social product and
instrument, most of whose rules, even in detail, have been as truly
evoked by human experience and adopted to advance human purposes
as have been railroads, sewers, the weather service, or the I8th Amend-
ment; and thus to leave him at least vaguely conscious of the law's
social origins and its social reactions. With that accomplished, he could
well be left to garner in his technical courses illustrations of the tortuous
processes of legal development as regards doctrinal details; and to
note in those courses either confirmations or contradictions of the
general ideas to which his mind would, in this introductory historical
course, have been exposed. But inasmuch as I postulate similar
purposes for the generalized course that I would offer to advanced
students, with only a difference in the intensity of exposure, I will delay
for a few moments to answer certain objections to the above suggestions
which, I am sure, have been formulated by various of my auditors as
I have read.
We may now pass to the question of more advanced historical courses.
Two casebooks would here be required to meet my ideal; but, as I
imagine them, they would by no means be adapted to any and every sort
of a course in legal history. In particular, they would not serve as the
basis for a wholly general course, designed to deal with the law in all
its aspects and at all stages of its development. The object of such a
course must be, I should suppose, primarily informational-that is, the
acquisition of information without reference to any generalized principle
or lesson. I, for one, should be inclined to restrict this informational
purpose to reading courses; but we are not now concerned with that
question. At all events it would seem very probable that no casebook
could be devised that would adequately serve the needs of auxiliary
reading in such a general course. Evidently we could not put into a
casebook the materials upon which Dr. Holdsivorth will base the seven
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or more volumes of his definitive edition. In my opinion we could not
even put into it a satisfactory sampling of his sources.
On the other hand we undoubtedly could do something in the way of
a general casebook if we confined ourselves to some limited period of
time; but such a collection of materials would seem to be best adapted
to specialized courses, which I am not here considering, or to research
training; and that also-for reasons already. indicated-I leave out of
account. Cross-section samplings, general in character, might indeed
serve very well, by their contrasts, the purposes already indicated as the
basis of the sort of casebook that I advocate; but this is by no means
certain. In particular, their effect would probably be weakened in
proportion to the generality or scope of their content; that is, cross-
sections of a single department of the law at different times, in a case-
book for a specialized course, would probably be more effective than
cross-sections covering more vaguely all departments in a casebook
attempting to deal with the whole law. In general, a casebook confined
either to one limited period or to several distinct periods seems to me,
therefore, undesirable. And in particular a collection confined to our
old law would clearly be unsatisfactory as an instrument for realizing
the specific purposes that I have postulated; for it would leave a gap
between the old law and the present law of our technical courses-yet
it is precisely across that gap that we should carry the student, for it is
that gap that must be made significant to him. In my opinion emphasis
should be put upon the modem law, carrying it as to every topic down
to and this side of Stimson's record of our legislation; and the old
should be only utilized, either to explain and justify the present law
or to show the inhibitory influence therein of antiquated rules that still
persist, giving as full a record as possible of all past criticism and agita-
tion for reform.
Of the two casebooks that seem desirable for advanced students one
would be devoted to the rationale of our law; of our law, although by
no means excluding purely theoretical and comparative discussions of
jurisprudential concepts. The emphasis in this volume would be upon
analysis. It would be a collection of cases and discussions bearing upon
the origin, history, present scope and inter-relations of the divisions and
concepts of our law. Although Dean Pound deliberately subordinated
the consideration of "system" in his Readings on the History and
System of the Common Law,
10 his book is nevertheless rather one of the
type here indicated than of the other type that I have in mind. But I
pass by .the questions suggested by his compilation, inasmuch as we are
to-day not concerned, primarily, with the framework of our law but
with its history.
To the latter I would devote my second casebook. This would aim
at a presentation of the general ends and aetiology of law, as illustrated
10 (2d ed. 1913).
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by a portion of our law; but the purpose of the book would be to
develop historical mindedness-not, primarily, to impart historical
information. Now, there are two topics that would seem to lend them-
selves peculiarly well to this purpose; and consequently I would devote
to these topics two sections of my casebook. That their history would
also, in all probability, convey more historical information with regard
to our law in general than would any other two topics is very fortunate,
though not the basis of my choice. These topics are the history of
property law and the history of remedies. I will refer to each of them.
The law of property is admittedly that department of our law in
which the past bulks largest in the rules of the present, and in which our
fear of disturbing basic social interests has resulted in the greatest
obstacles to betterment. It is therefore the subject that best lends itself
to the inculcation of the truths that I would wish to have imparted. I
would compile this section of the book in the following manner. The
framework is adopted because imposed by the historical content, but the
matter included would of course show the worthlessness of some of the
scaffolding and the weakened nature of other portions.
i. Things, and things corporeal and incorporeal; with illustrations,
old and modem. And here I would go sufficiently afield, into medieval
Germanic law and the modem German code, to make plain the signifi-
cance, as respects the general basis of our law of property, of our
continued adherence to the medieval inclusion of incorporeal things
under the general concept. 1
2. Some discussion of the broader divisions of our law-of persons,
of obligations, of property; definitions of "property," including the
'It is impossible, at this time, to expand the condensed suggestions here made
regarding the specific contents of the casebook, and I will only repeat here one
explanation that was made orally in the conference. The medieval Germanic law,
equally in England [2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1899)
124-149] and on the continent of Europe [see Hiibner, Gernanic Law (Philbrick's
transl. i918) 16o-69, 203] was full of incorporeal things, especially of incorporeal
hereditaments of which seisin was posited. Our own law is still full of incor-
poreal things; but the meaning of "thing," in the "law of things" of the present
German code, is ostensibly restricted to corporeal or physical things. But see
Schuster, German Civil Law (1907) 58-6o. Now consider a contract. When
contractual rights became alienable they took on one practical aspect of what we
call "property"; and to the extent that the contract relationship has come to be
protected, as an independent res, against interference by strangers to the obligation,
it has acquired another aspect of property. When these features of the contract
are in mind it is the most natural thing in the world for us to think of it as
"property." But evidently, though the "law of things" of the German code
corresponds in general to our law of "property," the developments just mentioned
could not, under that code, be envisaged and dealt with as they can be under our
law. The adherence on our part to, and departure on their part from, the medieval
concept of a "thing" inevitably entails important changes of theory and of
practical solution. Compare also our discussions of the nature of the interest
of the cestui que trust.
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practical test of exchange value and Austin's triple test of duration of
interest, privileges of enjoyment, and powers of alienation. Here I
would include, also, material on the actual history in our language of the
words "estate," "property," "owner" and "ownership," and "title."
Also various illustrations of the way in which the question arises (in
bankruptcy, probate proceedings, etc.) whether "something" is
"property."
3. The distinction between realty and personalty; its origin; the
difference between this distinction-almost peculiar to our law-and
that between movables and immovables-which is practically universal;
the practical tests upon which the distinction has been dependent at
different periods in our legal history; conversion by wills and contracts;
the extent to which demand has been made for the abolishment of the
distinction, and to which such demand has been realized; modern
statutes; illustrations of the importance of this distinction to-day.
4. Seisin and disseisin-with some resort, here also, to non-English
materials; relation of seisin to tenure and to estates, of present and of
expectant enjoyment, and to the alienation thereof; relation of seisin
to "title"; general history of disseisin, adverse possession, and pre-
scription.
5. Comparison of medieval remedial systems for the protection of
land and chattels; questions, in regard to chattels, of the interests of
bailee, thief, and trespasser (Ames and Bordwell essays) ; later history
of the hierarchy of land remedies, and their illustration in the law of
adverse possession.
6. Chattels personal; medieval forms; increasing variety and
economic importance in modem times; the same as to incorporeal
personalty; choses in action, expanding content, definitions attempted,
continued doubt as to the proper meaning of the term; generalities on
future interests in personalty.
7. Hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal; importance of the
latter in medieval theory and commerce; common-law canons of
descent, with history of American changes, oddities in present statutes;
local customs of descent, variants from the common law; with a little
here about senior-right and junior-right in various primitive legal
systems-enough to make clear the social meaning of all such rules-
and about the social reaction of the dominant English form.
8. Taking up, now, the elements of Austin's triple test-first:
Estates; uniqueness of this conception of our law; manifold logical
applications, also peculiar to our law, to which it leads in the field of
future interests; classification of estates; history of individual estates,
with special reference to lease-holds (now called "estates"), entails, and
future interests in land and chattels; distinction between legal and
equitable interests of various kinds; oddities (from the viewpoint of the
old law) in the terminology of the latter.
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9. Enjoyment, otherwise than by way of glienation; a little here of
the Hohfeld nomenclature, also of the police power; waste, and rights
of reversioners; "natural rights" in land, and nuisances interfering
therewith; motive torts in the use of property; rights in alieno solo;
various modes in which one may control his neighbor in the latter's use
of his own land-with enough regarding general restrictions upon, and
technical prerequisites to, the creation, and regarding the informal
destruction, of easements and rights of entry for condition broken to
illustrate the factor of public policy; differences between England and
the United States as regards covenants running with the land at law and
in equity-public policy again; meaning of the phrases "for the benefit
of" and "touching and concerning," in the law of easements and cove-
nants; control of other persons, owners of personalty, in their use of
the same. Here also I should be inclined to put the history of liens,
rents and rent charges, pledges and mortgages.
io. Alienation of interests, legal and equitable; history of wills; of
alienation inter vivos at common law and under the statute of uses;
oddities in the alienation of equitable interests; history of the aliena-
bility of "mere expectancies and possibilities" and of choses in action.
ii. Public interests and policy; publicital element in livery of seisin
and in modern recording systems; material on, or possibly'mere cross
references to, topics already covered-the struggle for a strict settle-
ment in tail, the police power, rights in alieno solo, restraints on aliena-
tion, rule against perpetuities-which have revealed the factor of public
policy; public rights, also franchises; eminent domain; game laws,
history of treasure-trove, gold and silver mines; inheritance taxes;
underlying social basis of all "title," original and derivative, to
property.
12. Reforms, accomplished and agitated, in the law of property.
Here might come some cross-section summaries of the law at different
periods. Careful attention to legislation would be given in every part
of the casebook.
As respects the second section of the compilation, that on legal
remedies, in the broadest sense, I will indicate more briefly my ideas.
My main reason for this is that I have. never taught any of the remedial
courses and have only glimpsed the problems that they present. It
seems evident, however, that two things are true: one, that the struggle
to stretch legal remedies to cover new wrongs-to change these from
moral into legal wrongs-is eternal; the other, that the effects of such
a struggle, of some five hundred years ago, is still discernible in the
classifications of our law. It seems to me that a casebook of immense
suggestiveness could be built up around these two ideas. No doubt
very much of the material is immediately available in casebooks made
or making. The old forms of action, and their later history; the ever-
lasting problem of the relation between remedy and substantive right;
the general development of -remedies in different parts of the judicial
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system, including here the ecclesiastical jurisdiction along with that of
equity and the courts of common law; the history of procedural reform;
the present relations between equity and common law ;--these are some
of the topics that I should like to have treated by someone competent
to do so.
I will endeavor to make more intelligible these very general remarks
by elaborating, somewhat, the topic last mentioned. I should like to
introduce subsections such as the following: circumistances that imposed
upon equity the abnegative principle that equity acts in personam, only;
the true formula of equitable jurisdiction-whether the principle just
stated (admitting that this may be the key to the mere procedure of
equity), or (as Mr. Billson contended) the principle that equity acts
upon a higher morality than law, is the truer key to equity's actual
development; the growth of equitable procedure in rem; what equity
acts to protect-modem extension of its remedies beyond the field of
property, with material, also, on such matters as Lord Selborne's sug-
gested distinction, in the law of nuisances, between injuries to property
and interference with the mere enjoyment of life; the question of the
actual relative jurisdiction of law and equity to-day-the actual effect
upon equitable jurisdiction of the liberalization of the law of damages
and of the growth of quasi-contract; the problem of the fusion of law
and equity-their ancient relations, and so-called "equitable" remedies
of assumpsit, trover, and case; the penetration of equitable principles,
in the strict or in a looser sense,-as to forfeiture, implied conditions,
stoppage in transitu, election, indemnity, contribution, exoneration,
subrogation, equitable defences to legal actions, the provision of the
English Judicature Act, etc.-into the law, including quasi-contract;
the apparent decadence of equitable remedies in the hands of courts
applying both systems; the question as to whether the two systems
"conflict"; and the general present possibilities of promoting fusion and
the predominance of equity.
This will, sufficiently illustrate my ideas.
Into both of these collections (as into the reading book for less
advanced students, were such to be compiled) I would introduce with
great liberality selections other than decisions. As regards -property,
Professor Kirchwey did this long ago in his Readings; 2 though my
preference would be for very different materials, to serve a different
purpose. Leake's essay before the Juridical Society on the Theory of
the Law of Property,"3 Vinogradoff's brief contribution to the History of
the English Classification of the different Kinds of Property,4 the papers
by Elphinstone, Sweet, and Williams"- on the definition of choses iti
"Readngs in The Law of Real Property (igoo).
"Papers Read before the Juridical Society: 1855-1858, 531.
"Festschrift: Heinrich Brunner-Dargebracht (Weimar, IgIO) 573.
'In volumes 9-11 of The lUw Quarterly Review.
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action-such are the materials, to instance a few topics at random, upon
which one might levy.
It is my contention that no student could go through such a book as I
have here imagined and escape liberalization. He would see the social
underpinning of ancient rules, and see those rules repealed, when that
basis had disappeared, by modern legislation; or would see the rules
endure, with no present props except prejudice or inertia. He could
not possibly escape the conviction that "Blackstone and Kent"-substi-
tuting negatives for Surrogate Fowler's affirmatives 6-did not "to all
intents and purposes furnish a science of law," and that Blackstone did
not give us (nor has anybody yet given us), "an accurate legal termin-
ology in the vernacular." He would see at various points and in various
aspects the relation between personal security, business and other social
interests, and public policy on the one hand and law on the other hand;
and a true conception of the law would inevitably become vital in his
mind. He might, indeed, leave the law school believing that the law
is "the noblest product of the human mind" (as one of my own
instructors called it), but certainly he would not imagine even it to be a
perfect instrument exactly adjusted to ideals. It is not to be forgotten
that in all his technical courses there will be a daily counter-influence
to anything which conservatives might fear in the above program. His
other casebooks he would use more reflectively, but there is no danger
whatever that he would ever come (even while in the law school) to
look upon cases as only, to use the phrase of Justice Holmes, "the small
change of legal thought." He will never look upon them as small
change, but he must be made to realize that they are only "change,"
only token currency; that is, indicators of social interests that are the
real values involved.
Of course many topics other than the two suggested by me could be
effectively used for the same purpose. The relation between law and
social interests could be illustrated by the legal status of telegraph and
telephone and the uniform state legislation in the field of commercial
law secured in recent years; the inter-action of conflicting interests
could be illustrated by the law of master and servant; the growing
refinement of law could be shown with refererice to the mental element
in crime, tort, estoppel, reformation; and so on. But it is believed that
on the whole the two topics that I have chosen combine the maximum
of merits.
I have remarked above that certain criticisms have doubtless, as I have
read, been formulated in the minds of my auditors. Though at the
cost of repetition I wish to refer to three of these-real or imagined-
objections.
First, I deny unqualifiedly that the student learns from the technical
courses these things that I wish him to learn. It was once frequently
" Fowler, The New Philosophies of Law (1914) 27 HARv. L. R-V. 718, 721-722.
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said that students, in some mysterious way, gained from those courses
"jurisprudence," or at least the system of our own law; but, assuming
that every department of our law may embody, as Pollock said of posses-
sion, "a fairly consistent body of principles," it is apparently generally
admitted to-day that law students do not perform such tasks as did Sir
Frederick Pollock, and that, as regards general jurisprudence, they could
not derive that from cases and (until our recent education) instructors
innocent theredf. Similarly as regards the historical notions above
adverted to, be they desirable or undesirable. The great majority of
students seem to me very scantily interested in the rich historical infor-
mation in their casebooks, and resistant even to its superficial impres-
sions. I have known students of equity, for example, despite a constant
iteration in that course upon historical influences and changes, and after
reading opinion after opinion, all dated, by Lord Eldon, to be quite
ignorant of the date of his activity; and have generally found that third-
year students will stumble up and down the centuries in attempting to
locate Bracton, Coke, Littleton, Blackstone, Mansfield, Bentham, Jessel,
and other legal luminaries of like magnitude. This is, indeed, not
quite so disheartening as would be the inability of a graduate student
of English poetry (taking a doctorate in literature) to give the centuries
of Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, Dryden, Byron, Shelley, and Brown-
ing-since in law we emphasize principles and submerge personalities;
but at the best it reveals an impressive lack of intellectual curiosity.
What is more important, the technical courses do not seem to develop
historical mindedness: such history as students perforce take note of
is noted only as something obsolete, to be forgotten; the broader lesson
is unseen. And finally, while we must all agree that students ought,
under the case method, to pass in consciousness, as Professor Powell
once remarked 17 that they do, "beyond the form and the expression of
law to some segment of the substance of life with which law deals," it
is my humble opinion that in actual fact they do not so pass. We all
know how difficult it is to induce students so to visualize the stories in
their casebooks as to present them, in their abstracts, simply and directly,
and as a human dispute : it is the rare student who perceives even the
surface of life-who evidently feels the humanity-in his casebooks.
As for the suggestion that students in general see the legal system
through myriad details, and draw from their technical cases the deeper
lessons of the law's history, I, for one, can only dissent. And yet-
Secondly: it cannot, I think, be denied that the purposes above stated
are fundamental prerequisites to real progress in the study and eventual
betterment of the law. Inattention to them has been for forty years
the gravamen of Justice Holmes's criticisms of the bench, bar, and law
schools of this country; their transcendent importance, the burden of
"Address on Law as a Cultural Study before The American Bar Association.
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his exhortations to us. In this respect he has been the leader, far
ahead of all followers, in this country.18 His salience alike as judge and
legal writer will ultimately rest primarily upon these ideas: as judge
because in his constitutional opinions he has frankly and constantly
insisted that law is made, and rightly made, by dominant opinion; and,
in other fields of the law, because alike as judge and writer he has for-
ever and in varied ways repeated that social needs and opinions are the
procrustean bed to which the law is bound and forced to conform; every
legal rule representing a choice, and every consequent judicial decision
an affirmation of such choice, "between competing social interests."
Yet these ideas have not penetrated widely in the profession outside of
the law schools. They are realities to economists, sociologists, social
welfare workers, and students of government, but they are mere empty
generalities to most lawyers; and if they remain so the law will be
"reformed," not by lawyers, but by laymen who are its bitter, and in the
main its unjustified, critics. We must-in some way, in all ways-train
students to take no casebook (no matter what the dates of its materials)
on a chronological level. We must make them realize, vitally and
impellently realize, that just because the law embodies "beliefs that have
triumphed," its rules can only he more or less impermanent conven-
tions; and that because these, in their reaction, tend to tie society to the
credenda of its past, they become, as its persuasions nevertheless and
necessarily change, constraints upon its growth. Simple ideas,
certainly; and as respects the public law there can hardly be even an
illiterate in the country so ignorant as not to know that we have adopted
the popular election of United States senators, woman suffrage, prohibi-
tion, and the income tax not only in response to public opinion but with
the resolution to purify our lives or better the world through the
constraint and reaction of law. And yet, in regard to the private law,
these ideas-though seemingly so trite that one feels apologetic before
the present audience for even mentioning them,-far from animating
the consciousness of lawyers and motivating their relations to their
profession and to society, are evidently ignored by them; wherefore the
anomalous antiquities in legal rules, and the call upon us (by one of our
own committees at this meeting of our Association) to reform. Now
it is idle to talk of effectively reforming the law, and still idler to talk
of effectively reforming its administration, until we have prepared for
reform in the consciousness of the profession; and the way for law
schools to reform lawyers is to enlighten and reform students. In my
opinion such a casebook on legal history as I have suggested would
materially aid us in this task.
Thirdly, and finally, I fear that to some of my hearers what I have
said of purposes will appear-if not, after my appeal to justice Holmes,
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graceless per se-at least too direct and shameless; too much like propa-
ganda in the odious sense which that word has recently borne. Devotees
of the Socratic method may say that the casebook suggested would do
violence to the student's mind and conscience. Nothing is farther from
my desires. My idea is that it does, perhaps, do violence to a student's
mind to teach him, for example, that contingent remainders, though
legal property interests since about 1430, are still in various states almost
without property content, being inalienable by the holder and destruc-
tible by others; but that the violence is lessened if we show him how
and why legislation has elsewhere given to such interests full protection.
I do not propose, however, that the student be told, by way of mere
ipse dixits, even from the mighty like Justice Holmes, that either all the
law or part of the law is out of joint. Any such assertions included
would, indeed, be from worthies of the profession: Bentham,
Brougham, Holmes, Joshua Williams, the Parliamentary Commis-
sioners, and the like. But even such assertions would be amply
controlled by the supporting data and by the other courses of the curri-
culum. I do not suggest dogmatism and preachment. I merely
suggest that we do--with somewhat different material, on a larger scale,
with single purpose and concentrated effort-what we already do inse-
quently, and with more or less scattering aim, in the technical courses:
offer all the facts, and among these the historical data, for judgment.
I merely propose to present the law's greatest single lesson so directly,
so concretely, so massively, that no intelligence can miss it.
